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Continued Resistance to the Inclusion of Personnel Policies
in Contracts of Employment: Griffin v. Housing
Authority of Durham
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the inequality of
bargaining power between employers and employees that often leaves employ-
ees helpless against their employers' arbitrary and reprehensible treatment.,
Under the employment-at-will doctrine, however, unless an employment con-
tract specifies a definite term of employment, an employer may discharge an
employee for "good cause, or for no cause, or even for bad cause."'2 This
doctrine was applied uniformly3 until strong criticism from commentators per-
suaded some courts to develop exceptions.4 Recently, some courts have found
an implied contract right to continued employment, absent a good faith reason
for termination.5 Others have created a cause of action in tort protecting em-
ployees against abusive or retaliatory discharges in contravention of public
policy. 6 The North Carolina courts, however, have been reluctant to follow
the modem trend relaxing the employment-at-will doctrine. In Grfi/n v. Hous-
ingAuthority of Durham7 the North Carolina Court of Appeals again refused
to adopt a rule that would have diminished the harshness of the at-will
doctrine.
In Griffin the city of Durham discharged plaintiff from his position as
Director of Operations as part of a reorganization plan. Plaintiff alleged that
the discharge breached his employment .contract because it did not comply
with the procedures for discharge set forth in defendant's personnel policy.8
Although the court of appeals concluded that the Authority had complied with
1. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1936). See generally, Blades,
Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power,
67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967).
2. Payne v. Western & At. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884). See Hutton v. Waters, 132
Tenn. 527, 540-44, 179 S.W. 134, 137-38 (1915) (upholding employer's right to fire at will).
3. "The rule's influence on the employment relationship in this country has been so perva-
sive that modern legal writing frequently accepts the doctrine without inquiring into its logic or its
applicability to current employment conditions." Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security,
26 STAN. L. REv. 335, 335 (1974).
4. See, e.g., Blades, supra note I; Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissak
Time/or a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976); Note, supra note 3.
5. Eg., Fortune v. National Cash Register, 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); Monge v.
Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
6. Eg., Peterman v. Local 396, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25
(1959) (discharge for refusal to give perjured testimony); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260
Ind. 249,297 N.E.2d 425 (1973) (discharge for filing workers' compensation claim); Nees v. Hocks,
272 Or. 210,536 P.2d 512 (1975) (discharge for reporting for jury service in violation of employer's
orders).
7. 62 N.C. App. 556, 303 S.E.2d 200 (1983).
8. Plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to do the following as required by defendant's per-
sonnel policies: (1) dismiss plaintiff pursuant to proper action by defendant's Board of Commis-
sioners; (2) offer plaintiff a position of similar or lower pay with defendant; (3) indicate clearly on
plaintiff's papers that his dismissal in no way reflected his ability or performance, so as not to
hinder his ability to obtain gainful employment elsewhere; and (4) give plaintiff notice and a
hearing prior to being dismissed. Record at 2-3, Grin, 62 N.C. App. 556, 303 S.E.2d 200 (1983).
LABOR LV4W
its personnel policies, it held that defendant was not obligated to follow its
personnel policies because they were amended after plaintiff was hired and
were not incorporated expressly in plaintiff's contract.9
Griffin denies employees an important protection from the employment-
at-will rule. The proposition that personnel policies may establish terms and
conditions of the employment contract is supported by modem contract theory
and has been adopted by several courts. 10 Further analysis of the case law and
commentary concerning incorporation of personnel policies in contracts of
employment should persuade North Carolina courts to reconsider this ques-
tion. Recognition of personnel policies as part of the employment contract
would constitute an important first step toward the goal of eliminating the
employment-at-will doctrine and provide employees needed protection against
the arbitrariness of the doctrine.
Supporters of the doctrine argue that employer power to discharge at will
is essential to the efficient and profitable operation of a business. To abolish
the doctrine would ignore employers' legitimate interest in hiring and retain-
ing the best personnel available. 12 Employers also question whether judges
and juries should be allowed to question business judgments. 13 Evaluation of
high ranking employees crucial to a business' success often involves highly
personal and intuitive judgments that are not translated easily into concrete
justifications.' 4
In addition, some commentators fear that restriction of the employment-
at-will rule will bring a flood of vexatious and costly litigation 5 before juries
sympathetic to employee's "fabricated tales" of employer unfaimess.16 Fear
of litigation will discourage personnel termination decisions and reduce busi-
ness efficiency. 17 This chilling effect is increased by the lack of standards de-
fining what employer conduct violates public policy or implied promises of
good faith.' 8
Opponents of the employment-at-will doctrine have stressed the doc-
trine's severe effects on employee interests, emphasizing the employee's depen-
9. Griffin, 62 N.C. App. at 557, 303 S.E.2d at 201.
10. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980);
Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
11. Note, Recognizing the Employee's Interests in Continued Employment-The California
Cause ofActionfor Unjust Dismissal, 12 PAc. L.J. 69, 79 (1980). See also Pierce v. Ortho Pharma-
ceutical Corp., 166 N.J. Super. 335, 341, 399 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1979).
12. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 181, 319 A.2d 174, 179 (1974).
13. See Note, The Development of Exceptions to At- Will Employment: A Review of the Case
Lawfrom Management's Viewpoint, 51 CIN. L. REv. 616, 631-32 (1982) (The traditional refusal to
review the wisdom of decisions made by corporate boards-the business judgment rule-should
be applied to employment decisions.).
14. See Blades, supra note 1, at 1428; Murg & Scharman, Employment at Will: Do the Excep-
tions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C.L. REv. 329, 331 (1982).
15. See Note, supra note 13, at 630; Note, Limiting The Right to Terminate at Will-Have The
Courts Forgotten The Employer, 35 VAND. L. REv. 201, 228 (1982).
16. See Blades, supra note 1, at 1428.
17. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 181, 319 A.2d 174, 179 (1974).
18. See Note, supra note 13, at 631; Note, supra note 15, at 228-29.
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dence on his job as his sole source of income,19 the loss of self esteem
associated with termination of employment,20 and the lack of mobility that
limits alternative employment opportunities. 21 In addition, abandonment of
the employment-at-will rule may improve long-run business productivity by
promoting a stable and loyal workforce, which would reduce the inefficiency
and training costs that arise from employee turnover.22 The experience of
other industrial countries that protect employees against unlawful discharge
suggests that employer concerns over the impact of expanded job security may
be exaggerated. 23 In sum, the employer's absolute right to discharge, "when
weighed against the interests of the employee as an individual, [is] clearly not
justified by the employer's legitimate concerns."'24
The leading case affirming the employment-at-will doctrine in North Car-
olina is Still v. Lance,25 in which the supreme court upheld a school board's
termination of a teacher's contract without cause and reaffirmed employers'
rights to terminate at will "irrespective of the quality of performance by the
other party."26 The court did qualify its holding, stating in dictum that:
Where. . .there is a business usage, or other circumstance, appear-
ing on the record,. . . which shows that, at the time the parties con-
tracted, they intended the employment to continue through a fixed
term, the contract cannot be terminated at an earlier period except
for cause or by mutual consent.27
The federal district court in Thomas v. Ward28 relied on the Still dictum
in holding that language in an employee handbook "served as prima facie
evidence which could lead a teacher to believe that he had tenure after three
years service in the school system."'29 Thomas concluded that this language
entitled the teacher to a hearing prior to discharge.30 No state court, however,
has relied on the Still dictum to find an unlawful discharge, 3 ' and the employ-
19. "We have become a nation of employees. We are dependent upon others for our
means of livelihood and most of our people have become completely dependent upon
wa~es. If they lose their jobs they lose every resource, except for relief supplied by the
various forms of social security. Such dependence of the mass of the people upon others
for all of their income is something new in the world. For our generation the substance of
lfe ir in another man's hands."
F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951).
20. See Note, supra note 3, at 339.
21. This decreasing mobility arises from decreasing opportunities as employees grow older
and seniority and pension plans pursued by employers increasingly encourage work force stabil-
ity. d. at 338-339. Furthermore, advancing technology leads employees to acquire specialized
skills not readily transferable to other jobs. See Blades, supra note 1, at 1405.
22. Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge- The Duty to Terminate
Onyin Good Faith, 93 HAnv. L. REv. 1816, 1830-31 (1980).
23. Id. at 1835-36 (noting the experiences of West Gerany and Japan).
24. Blades, supra note 1, at 1407.
25. 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971).
26. Id. at 259, 182 S.E.2d at 406.
27. Id.
28. 374 F. Supp. 206 (M.D.N.C. 1974), rev'd in part, 529 F.2d 916 (4th Cir. 1975).
29. Id. at 210 n.4.
30. Id. at 210.
31. Business custom or usage must establish a definite, fixed term of employment and gener-
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ment-at-will doctrine remains firmly entrenched in the common law of North
Carolina. 32
Enforcement of personnel policies as contractual rights is the most rea-
sonable method of limiting the harshness of the employment-at-will doctrine,
particularly since employers benefit from the personnel policies they enact.
Many personnel policies result from a company's desire to keep unions out of
its plants.33 Personnel policies also can build employee morale and conse-
quently increase employee efficiency.34 In this way, they benefit both the em-
ployer and employee, increasing employees' contentment with their jobs,
causing employees to forego their rights to seek other employment, and help-
ing to avoid labor turnover.35 The impracticality and high costs of negotiating
individual employment contracts containing job security provisions have led
employees to rely on standard employment-at-will contracts, 36 but personnel
policies allow the employer to avoid these transaction costs and provide a con-
tract that satisfies the needs of employees.
Nevertheless, in Grin the North Carolina Court of Appeals chose not to
enforce personnel policies. Other courts generally have given three reasons for
not enforcing personnel policies: the lack of mutuality of obligation; the lack
of necessary additional consideration; and the employment-at-will rule's pre-
cedence over any personnel policy restrictions.37 Recently, courts have been
more willing to discard these traditional contract requirements in favor of
modern contract theories that protect the reasonable expectations of employ-
ees and employers alike.38
The primary legal underpinning of the employment-at-will doctrine was
the principle of mutuality of obligation.3 9 Courts following this principle rea-
soned that if an employee could quit his job at will, the employer must have a
ally cannot limit an employer's right to terminate for good cause only. See Roberts v. Wake
Forest Univ., 55 N.C. App. 430, 435-36, 286 S.E.2d 120, 123-24 (custom for golf coaches to serve
long terms and personnel policy statements that employment became permanent after three
months insufficient to establish a "fixed term"), disc. rev. denied, 305 N.C. 586, 292 S.E.2d 571
(1982).
32. See Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71, 80, 221 S.E.2d 282, 288 (1975); Dyer v. Brad-
shaw, 54 N.C. App. 136, 139-40, 282 S.E.2d 548, 551 (1981); Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36
N.C. App. 293, 297, 244 S.E.2d 272, 275, disc. rev. denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978).
33. Some companies not only duplicate much of union contracts, but also impose on them-
selves policies that are more restrictive than those that may emerge under union contract arrange-
ments. F. FOULKES, PERSONNEL POLICIES IN LARGE NON UNION COMPANIES 341 (1980).
34. R. Machol & E. Button, HANDBOOK OF MODERN PERSONNEL ADMWNISTRATION § 74-1
(1972).
35. Chinn v. China Nat'l Aviation Corp., 138 Cal. App. 2d 98, 99-100, 291 P.2d 91, 92 (1955).
See also Hepp v. Lockheed-California Co., 86 Cal. App. 3d 714, 719, 150 Cal. Rptr. 408, 411
(1978).
36. See Note, supra note 22, at 1830-31.
37. See Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 628-29 (Minn.1983); Comment,
Wrongful Termination of Employees at Will- The California Trend, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 259, 264
(1983).
38. See Note, Challenging the Employment-At- Will Doctrine Through Modern Contract The-
ory, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF., 449, 455 (1983).
39. Note, Judicial Limitation of the Employment A4t- Will Doctrine, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 552,
555 (1980).
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corresponding right to terminate the relationship for any or no reason. 40
Thus, the employers should not be bound by promises not to terminate except
for good cause or unless certain procedures were followed.4 1
Hablas v. Armour & Co. 42 demonstrates the inequitable consequences of
adherence to mutuality requirements. In Hablas plaintiff was fired one year
before retirement, losing all company pension rights after forty-five years of
service to defendant. Plaintiff argued that he had been dissuaded from ac-
cepting more lucrative job offers because of repeated reminders from defend-
ant's managers of the retirement benefits he would lose. Plaintiff further
contended that these inducements constituted an implied promise that he
would be retained until retirement, but the court held that because plaintiff
was "at all times free to terminate his employment at will. . . the purported
employment contract [was] void for want of mutuality."43
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has applied similar reasoning, In
Williams v. Biscuitville44 plaintiff alleged that defendant had breached its em-
ployment contract by failing to give a verbal and written warning prior to
discharge, as provided by the company personnel manual. The court held that
since the warning provisions were part of a policy unilaterally implemented by
the employer, the employer could discharge plaintiff in ways other than as set
forth in the policy manual.45
The notion that either both parties are bound or neither is bound has
been discredited by recognition of the validity of the unilateral contract.46 In
a unilateral contract the offeree's bargained for performance is the detriment
that makes the offeror's promise an enforceable contract, despite the absence
of mutuality.47 In response to a defendant's claim of lack of mutuality in an
employment contract context, the Michigan Supreme Court in Toussaint v.
40. Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate, 174 La. 66, 69, 139 So. 760, 761 (1932). See also
Gollberg v. Branson Publishing Co., 685 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1982) (specific performance
would constitute a form of involuntary servitude).
41. "It is ironic that application of the mutuality notion to the employment relationships has
been expressed as arising out of a primary concern for the freedom of employees. . . ." Blades,
supra note 1, at 1419 n.71.
42. 270 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1959).
43. Id. at 78. This principle was followed in Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 165 Ind. App. 1, 328
N.E.2d 775 (1975), in which the court held that a personnel policy providing for three warnings
before discharge was unenforceable for want of mutuality of obligation. The court stated that
"[t]here being no binding promise on the part of the employee that he would continue in the
employment, it must also be regarded as terminable at [the employer's] discretion as well." Id. at
5, 328 N.E.2d at 779. See also Edwards v. Citibank, 100 Misc. 2d 59, 60, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269, 270
(1979) (right to just-cause dismissal in personnel policy held unenforceable as being "utterly lack-
ing in mutuality"), af'd, 74 A.D.2d 553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1980).
44. 40 N.C. App 405, 253 S.E.2d 18 (1979).
45. Id. at 408, 253 S.E.2d at 20.
46. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 4-14 (1977); See also Armstrong Paint & Var-
nish Works v. Contintental Can Co., 301 Ill. 102, 108, 133 N.E. 711, 714 (1921) (if mutuality were
held to be an essential element in every contract, there could be no such thing as a valid unilateral
or option contract); Scott v. J. F. Duthie & Co., 125 Wash. 470, 216 P. 853 (1923) (principle of
mutuality has no place in the consideration of a unilateral contract).
47. The typical example of an offer of a unilateral contract is: "If you walk across the Brook-
lyn Bridge, I will pay you ten dollars." In this example, the offeree has not been requested to bind
himself to do anything. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 46, § 4-15.
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Blue Cross & Blue Shield48 stated:
[W]hile defendant's analysis has validity with respect to bilateral
contracts or agreements, we note that the typical employment agree-
ment is unilateral in nature . . . the employer makes an offer or
promise which the employee accepts by performing the act upon
which the promise is expressly or impliedly based . . . there is no
contractual requirement that the promisee do more than perform the
act upon which the promise is predicated in order to legally obligate
the promisor.49
Thus, the Toussaint court's unilateral contract analysis allows a finding of
promissory liability of the employer without the necessity of finding a return
promise by the employee.:50
Several courts, including the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Bis-
cuitville,5t have concluded that personnel policies are not enforceable provi-
sions of an employment contract because they are unilateral, gratuitous
offerings.52 Yet, as noted by the Toussaint court, employment contracts are
unilateral by nature. Bilateral agreements are impractical because of the high
costs of negotiating and monitoring individual contracts with a large number
of employees.5 3 Employee acceptance of unilaterally decided terms spares
employers the expense and uncertainty of bargaining by allowing employers to
calculate terms before entering into contracts.54 Thus, denying employees the
protection of job security provisions voluntarily offered by employers through
personnel policies on the basis of technical requirements of mutuality of obli-
gation ignores the existence of unilateral contract analysis. 5
Lack of consideration has been cited as a second reason for refusing to
include personnel policies in employment contracts. 56 This rationale is based
48. 408 Mich. 599, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
49. Id. at 630, 292 N.W.2d at 900.
50. Difficulty with this analysis arises in light of RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 62 (1981) which states that beginning of performance operates as a promise to render complete
performance. What constitutes complete performance by an employee is unclear. Pettit, Modem
Unilateral Contracts, 63 B.U.L. REV. 551, 566 (1983).
51. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Sargent v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 78 Ill. App. 3d 117, 121, 397 N.E.2d 443, 446
(1979); Johnson v. National Beef Packing, 220 Kan. 52, 54-55, 551 P.2d 779, 782 (1976); Gates v.
Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Mont. 1982).
53. See supra text accompanying note 36.
54. Note, supra note 39, at 456.
55. As stated by Professor Corbin, "denial of enforcement [of an employment contract] can-
not be justified by a mere statement that the contract is lacking in mutuality." 1A A. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 152 (1963). Counsel facing a jurisdiction still clinging to the mutuality
principle should examine closely the personnel policy in question. Some limitations on employee
behavior may be construed as the necessary return promise. See Carter v. Kaskaskia Community
Action Agency, 24 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1059, 322 N.E.2d 574, 576 (1974) (policy requiring employee
to give 30 days notice of resignation or face loss of vacation pay constituted mutuality of
obligation).
56. See Sargent v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 78 Ill. App. 3d 117, 121,397 N.E.2d 443, 446 (1979);
Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Mont. 1982). One commentator has noted
that the difficulty of relaxing rigid rules of consideration made it unlikely that the employer's right
to terminate the at will relationship could be limited under contract law. Blades, supra note I, at
1421. Consequently, Professor Blades turned to the law of torts for limitations on employers'
rights to terminate at will.
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on the assertion that limitations on employers' termination powers must be
supported by some independent consideration since the employee is regarded
as fully recompensed for his services by wages.57 This requirement also stems
from a concern for ensuring that the parties intended a continuing relation-
ship.58 This rigid consideration requirement also has been criticized. In Pugh
v. See's Candies, Inc. 59 plaintiff alleged that his unexplained discharge after
thirty-two years of service had violated oral assurances that he would not be
discharged except for good cause. The court agreed, and found "no analytical
reason why an employee's promise to render services, or his actual rendition of
services over time may not support an employer's promise both to pay a par-
ticular wage. . . and to refrain from arbitrary dismissal."' 60 The court noted
that the requirement of independent consideration was contrary to the general
principle that courts should not inquire into the adequacy of consideration,
and concluded that the employee's services were sufficient consideration. 6'
Similarly, in Pine River State Bank v. Mettille6 2 the Minnesota Supreme
Court enforced procedural discharge provisions of an employee handbook.
The requirement of additional consideration. . . does not preclude
the parties, if they make clear their intent to do so, from agreeing that
the employment will not be terminable by the employer except pur-
suant to their agreement, even though no consideration other than
services to be performed is expected by the employer or promised by
the employee. 63
The court noted that the employer had issued an employee handbook to pro-
mote a more stable and productive workforce, and that plaintiff had continued
working despite his freedom to leave.64 These factors indicated that handbook
provisions on disciplinary procedures had become part of the contract. 65
Thus, under modern contract theory, the consideration provided by an
employee's services may support employer promises of job security expressed
in personnel policies. The detriment an employee suffers by continuing to
work for an employer despite his freedom to leave is not just a creative charac-
terization of the facts. There seems to be much truth in the assertion that "an
employee has suffered real detriment in the irretrievable loss of productive
57. Simmons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 311 So. 2d 28, 31 (La. Ct. App. 1975).
58. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 326, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925 (1981).
59. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
60. Id. at 325-26, Cal. Rptr, at 925. See also Weiner v. McGraw Hill, Inc., 443 N.E,2d 441,
445, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 197 (1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 80, comment a
(1981).
61. Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 325, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 924-25.
62. 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
63. Id. at 629. See also Drzewiecki v. H. & R. Block Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 703-04, 101
Cal. Rptr. 169, 174 (1972).
64. Brooks v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 805, 809 (D. Col. 1983); Wagner v.
Sperry Univac, 458 F. Supp. 505, 520 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 624 F.2d 1092 (1980); Langdon v.
Saga Corp., 596 P.2d 524, 527 (Okl. App. 1976); Yartzhoff v. Democrat-Herald Publishing Co.,
576 P.2d 356, 359 (Or. 1982).
65. Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 630. See also Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, 668 P.2d 261
(Nev. 1983) (The company's issuance of such handbooks and plaintiff's knowledge of pertinent
provisions suggest that the handbook formed part of the employment contract of the parties.).
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years, especially when his seniority and experience are not likely to be readily
transferable to another job."66 Any evidentiary function of independent con-
sideration has been displaced largely by a willingness to infer an agreement
from an employer's issuance of personnel policies and an employee's knowl-
edge of these policies. 67
The need for additional consideration also may arise when the employer's
personnel policy is promulgated or amended after the employee has com-
menced work. GrJln implied that the amendment of the personnel policies
after plaintiff was hired was a factor in its refusal to enforce the policies.
Traditional contract rules provide that an agreement to alter the terms of a
contract must be supported by new consideration. 68 This rule is intended to
prohibit modifications obtained by coercion, duress, or extortion when one
party agrees to modify the agreement in the face of threats of nonperform-
ance.69 Because contracting parties often desire to alter their agreements in
response to changes in circumstances, 70 modem contract theory changed to
reflect this consideration. The Uniform Commercial Code recognizes that a
modification of good faith sales agreements needs no consideration to be bind-
ing.71 This rationale-promoting enforcement of arm's length alterations of
contract and denying enforcement of coerced modifications72 -suggests that
alterations of an employment contract in favor of the employee should be en-
forced. Because the employer is invariably in the superior bargaining posi-
tion, he is unlikely to be coerced by employees into unilaterally modifying his
promises.
Finally, the third argument cited to support the refusal to enforce person-
nel policies as part of the employment contract, is the belief that the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine takes precedence over any such restrictions. In Chin v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. 7 3 the court rejected plaintiff's contract
claim based on provisions of an employee manual because the manual did not
contain all the terms of employment, specifically the length of employment.
The court concluded that in the absence of a specific term, the employment
contract was terminable at will.7 4 Similarly, in Muller v. Stromberg Carlson
66. Blades, supra note 1, at 1420.
67. Employees may not have to be aware of the personnel policy prior to termination. Be-
cause the employer made promises to a class of employees, communication to some members of
the class was sufficient for all. It would be unfair, impractical, and inefficient to base an em-
ployee's right to recover on whether he read the company's benefit policies. See Pettit, supra note
50, at 583.
68. See Brenner v. Little Red School House Ltd., 302 N.C. 207, 215, 274 S.E.2d 206, 212
(1981); Wheeler v. Wheeler, 299 N.C. 633, 636, 263 S.E.2d 763, 765 (1980).
69. See, e.g., Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewery Co., 103 Mo. 578, 593, 15 S.W. 844, 847-48
(1891); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 46, § 4-8.
70. Hillman, Contract Mod~fcation Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 COR.
L.Q. 680, 681 (1982).
71. U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (1977). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (1979)
("promise modifying a duty ... is binding if the modification is fair and equitable in view of
circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract was made").
72. Hillman, supra note 70, at 681.
73. 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1978).
74. Id. at 1072, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 739. See also White v. Chelsea Ind., 425 So.2d 1090 (Ala.
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Corp. 75 the Florida Court of Appeals held that employment policies did not
give rise to a right to just-cause dismissal because enforcement of such policies
would introduce uncertainty into the employer-employee relationship.76 Like
Chin, the Muller court contemplated an employment contract specifying a
term expressed in months or years.
These arguments, however, misconstrue the employment-at-will doctrine.
The doctrine is a rule of contract construction, and does not impose substan-
tive limits on the formation of an employment contract.77 A rule of construc-
tion should signal a court to construe a contract by looking beyond its face to
the parties' true intentions.78 An employer might reveal his intent to limit his
power of termination by unilaterally offering job security provisions in the
form of personnel policies. The courts should not limit the employer to offer-
ing only terminable-at-will contracts.
Thus, modem contract theory has supplanted the traditional reasons
courts have proffered for refusing to incorporate personnel policies into em-
ployment contracts. North Carolina's continuing refusal to enforce such poli-
cies in cases like Griffin and Biscuitville no longer is justified. The North
Carolina Court of Appeals already has decided a case that supports enforce-
ment of personnel policies. In Brooks v. Carolina Telephone & Telegraph Co. 79
the court of appeals approved plaintiff's claim for severance pay because of
provisions in defendant company's personnel policy. The court accepted
plaintiff's claim that severance pay provisions contained in defendant's per-
sonnel policy were part of the employment contract, stating that "such an em-
ployment contract provision, recognizably cancellable at will by an employer,
would nevertheless operate to protect employees within its coverage during
their employment and during the effective operation of such a provision. ' 80
The court distinguished Biscuitville by stating that Biscuiville "dealt with each
employee's right to continued employment and did not deal with the issue of
benefits or compensation earned during employment."81
This distinction is not convincing. Plaintiffs in Biscuitville and Grffin did
not allege any right to continued or permanent employment; plaintiffs in all
three cases alleged breach of contract based on personnel policy provisions
that were not included expressly in their employment contracts. It is unclear
why the right to warnings, notice, hearings prior to dismissal, or to dismissal
for just cause are not considered benefits earned during employment, whereas
1983) (employee handbook did not vary the common-law rule that an employee is terminable at
will); Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp., 446 A.2d 1095, 1097 (Del. 1982), (handbook did not grant
employee a specific term of employment and does not therefore alter plaintiff's at will status).
75. 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
76. Id. at 270.
77. See Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 599, 292 N.W.2d at 890-91; Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 628;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442, comment a (1958).
78. Note, Job Securityfor the At Will Employee. A Contractual Right of Dischargefor Cause,
57 CH.[-]KENT L. REv. 697, 719 (1981).
79. 56 N.C. App. 801, 290 S.E.2d 370 (1982).
80. Id. at 804, 290 S.E.2d at 372 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 805, 290 S.E.2d at 372.
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severance pay is considered such a benefit.82 By eliminating this artificial dis-
tinction between monetary and procedural benefits, the North Carolina courts
could enforce all personnel policies under the Brooks rationale.
It has been suggested that employers might respond to attempts to enforce
personnel policies by including disclaimers in employee handbooks stating
that employees serve at will and may be discharged at any time and for any
reason.83 Such a disclaimer has been upheld in at least one case, 84 but several
courts have questioned its effectiveness. In Sch~gani v. Ford Motor Co. 8 5 the
court held that despite the disclaimer the employee handbook's allusions to
fairness in any termination may be enforced to prevent injustice.8 6 Similarly,
in Greene v. Howard University8 7 defendant's employee handbook contained a
qualifier that its provisions were not contractual obligations. The court, how-
ever, held that the policies and practices of the University embodied in its
handbook regulations and customs contemplated a hearing prior to termina-
tion, despite the disclaimer.88 These cases indicate that courts will be reluctant
to allow an employer to take back with one hand what it gives with the other.
If the employer chooses to create expectations of entitlement to fair and uni-
form personnel policy application, he may not be permitted to disclaim them.
Giving personnel policies the force of contract has been criticized for fear
that employers will be encouraged to withdraw them.89 Such a consequence is
unlikely since employers would sacrifice the benefits of increased employee
morale and productivity that flow from a sound personnel policy.90 Further-
more, enforcement of personnel policies should not substantially increase costs
to the employer. A policy providing employees the right to just-cause dis-
charge does not require the employer to retain unsatisfactory employees. Re-
tention of the freedom to discharge arbitrarily may lead to a waste of training,
continuity, and expertise.91 Provisions requiring warnings or a predischarge
hearing are not onerous or costly invasions of an employers' freedom; they
actually may improve communication between management and employees.
Any costs of vexatious litigation may be reduced by including binding arbitra-
tion 92 provisions which an employer can draft to fit his needs.
82. "[A]n agreement between an employee and her employer concerning the manner in
which her job could be terminated constitutes an enforceable agreement." Bennett v. Eastern
Rebuilders, Inc., 52 N.C. App. 579, 581, 279 S.E.2d 46, 48 (1981) (plaintiff could be terminated at
will from her supervisor position; however, such termination was not to result in her discharge,
but in her demotion to her former job).
83. Toussaint, 408 Mich at 612, 292 N.W.2d at 891.
84. Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
85. 102 Mich. App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981).
86. 302 N.W.2d at 311 (Mich. App.).
87. 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
88. Id. at 1134.
89. See Note, The Burden of Estabishing Standards of Performance as a Basisfor Employment
Termination Rests upon the Employer, 59 U. DET J. URB. L. 83, 95-96 (1981).
90. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
91. See Note, supra note 22, at 1834-35.
92. See Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 624, 292 N.W.2d at 897. See also Summers, Individual Pro-
tection Against Unjust Dismissal Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481, 521 (1976) (suggesting
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In conclusion, judicial refusal to allow exceptions to the employment-at-
will doctrine usually is based on dated contract principles or a simple reluc-
tance to let go of a concept that just a few years ago seemed inviolable. Seri-
ous inroads into the employment-at-will doctrine, however, are inevitable.
The recognition that personnel policies constitute enforceable contract rights
can provide many of the protections employees need against abusive discharge
while allowing employers to retain some control and flexibility in shaping
their work force. Both employers and employees can benefit from a decision
to enforce personnel policies as part of the employment contract. North Caro-
lina's courts should take note of current contract and employment trends, re-
examine their personnel policy position, and adopt this personnel policy
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.
HARLEY HARRELL JONES
passage of statutory right not to be dismissed except for just cause with adjudication of the right
through arbitration).
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